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Abstract 
The report examines the fiscal impact of undocumented persons at the federal, 
state, and local levels in order to explain the likely effects of an amnesty program.  The 
report first provides background on the population of undocumented persons in the 
United States and an overview of the laws which govern their status. Details of past and 
current amnesty legislation are given. The channels through which undocumented 
immigrants have a fiscal impact on the three levels of government in the United States 
are explained. The paper discusses the economic theory relating to immigration and its 
effect on economic growth. Published works on the fiscal impact of the undocumented on 
state and local budgets and on federal programs such as social security are reviewed. The 
research reviewed includes an analysis of the long-term fiscal impact of immigrants. 
Undocumented immigrants impose a net cost at the state and local levels in most cases. 
However, many undocumented immigrants make income and payroll tax payments and 
the population of undocumented immigrants imposes a net benefit at the federal level. 
These sources of information are then used to explain how an amnesty program might 
change the fiscal impact of the undocumented at the three levels of government. The 
recent executive order signed by President Obama, known as Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), is an amnesty program that has a strong potential to help 
the U.S. economy retain young and highly educated workers, who have a positive fiscal 
impact on government finances. This report draws certain recommendations for the 
design of a successful amnesty and for implementing other immigration reforms from 
published research. 
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1. Introduction 
On June 15, 2012, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was 
issued as an executive order by President Obama. In essence, DACA extends temporary 
amnesty to a select group of undocumented persons: those who were brought here by 
their parents, those who are young adults, and those who are relatively educated. DACA 
is the first amnesty to be undertaken by executive order and follows decades of 
sometimes contentious debate on the topic of undocumented persons. What the data 
discussed in this report indicate is that undocumented persons make up an estimated 
3.72% of the U.S. population, are concentrated in just a few U.S. states, and on balance 
generate net fiscal costs for these states, which helps to explain the contentious aspects of 
the debate. At the federal level, undocumented persons are estimated to contribute more 
in tax revenues than they take in federal services. What I conclude is that an amnesty 
program that includes compensation to the affected states can, on balance, generate a net 
positive economic effect.  
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
characteristics of the undocumented persons in the U.S. labor market. Considerations and 
expectations about the effects of undocumented immigration according to economic 
theory are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of U.S. legislation 
since 1986 pertaining to undocumented persons. Section 5 explains how undocumented 
persons relate to the structure of government in the U.S. Specifically, it discusses the 
channels through which undocumented persons affect government finances. Section 6 
provides empirical evidence from existing studies as to the fiscal impacts of 
undocumented persons. The possible economic growth effects of granting amnesty to 
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undocumented persons are discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes by discussing 
amnesty design and the likely effects of a program such as DACA, which targets amnesty 
at the young and educated. 
 
2. Characteristics of Undocumented Persons in the United States 
The estimated number of undocumented persons in the U.S. declined somewhat 
during the past few years, after having grown during the previous two decades. Hoefer et 
al. (2012), of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Immigration 
Statistics, using the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS), based on the 2010 
Census, estimate that there were 11.5 million undocumented persons living in the United 
States in 2011, which is a 0.8% decline from the DHS estimate of 11.6 million 
undocumented persons in 2010. Passel and Cohn (2011), of The Pew Hispanic Center, 
report a slightly lower 2010 estimate at 11.2 million undocumented persons using the 
March Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Note that the U.S. 
population in 2011 was 311.6 million persons (U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts), so as a 
percentage of the U.S. population in 2011, undocumented persons comprise an estimated 
3.72%.  
The Pew Hispanic Center has undertaken extensive research to document the 
characteristics of undocumented persons. There are three reports in particular by Passel 
and Cohn in 2009, 2010, and 2011 that I draw on in this section. As noted in Passel and 
Cohn (2011), while the recent decline in the number of undocumented persons in the U.S. 
from 2010 to 2011 is small in magnitude, it is sizable when compared to 2007, when the 
number of undocumented persons present in the United States reached an estimated 
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historical peak of 12 million. The decline in the number of undocumented persons 
correlates with the U.S. recession. Prior to that, the number of undocumented persons 
was increasing steadily, from an estimated 3.5 million persons in 1990 to the peak of 12 
million in 2007 (Passel and Cohn, 2011). Over this time period, from 1990 to 2007, the 
annual growth rate in the number of undocumented persons was 14.29%. 
Most undocumented persons in the United States at present are Hispanic: 56% of 
them are Mexican, and an additional 20% are from other Central or South American 
countries according to Passel and Cohn (2011). In contrast, in 2008, Mexicans formed 
59% of the undocumented population. Other data for 2008 include countries in Central 
America and South America, accounting for 11% and 7%, respectively, of the 
undocumented population in the U.S. Of the non-Hispanic undocumented persons, Asia 
was the source of 11%, the Caribbean 4%, and the Middle East was the source of less 
than 2% of undocumented people (Passel and Cohn, 2009).   
Note that the growth or decline of the undocumented population is dependent on 
the flows of undocumented persons into and out of the United States. Using March 
Supplements to the CPS, Passel and Cohn (2010) estimate declining annual inflows 
during the 2000s, with 850,000 undocumented persons from 2000 to 2005, 500,000 
undocumented persons from 2005 to 2007, and then only 300,000 undocumented persons 
from 2007 to 2009 coming into the U.S. Yearly inflows do not exactly match the growth 
in the undocumented population because some undocumented persons return to their 
home countries every year. For example, of the gross annual inflow of 850,000 
undocumented persons, Hoefer et al. (2006) report a net increase in undocumented 
persons of only 400,000 in the early 2000s. Moreover, 55% of undocumented persons 
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living in the U.S. in 2011 are estimated to have arrived in the U.S. between 1995 and 
2004, and only 14% have entered since 2005 (Hoefer et al., 2012). We can see from these 
numbers that a booming U.S. economy brings in undocumented persons.  
Estimates indicate that undocumented persons are geographically concentrated, at 
present, primarily along the U.S.-Mexico border. For example, in 1990, California‟s 
share of the undocumented population was 42% (Passel and Cohn, 2009). However, 
undocumented persons tend to disperse to or settle in new areas over time. For example, 
Passel and Cohn (2010) report that California‟s share of the undocumented population is 
now 23%. Undocumented persons have increasingly settled in Georgia, Arizona, and 
North Carolina, however, geographic concentration persists, and, according to 2009 data, 
54% of all undocumented persons live in five U.S. States: California, Texas, Florida, 
New York, and Illinois (Passel and Cohn, 2010).  
In addition to their numbers, flows, and settlement patterns, understanding the 
fiscal impact of undocumented persons requires that we know something about their 
labor market participation. Research indicates that most undocumented persons in the 
U.S. participate in the U.S. workforce, have relatively low education levels and have 
lower median income levels than documented persons. Passel and Cohn (2011) find that, 
out of the estimated 11.6 million undocumented persons, there were around 8 million 
undocumented persons in the U.S. labor force in March 2010. Put differently, 69% of 
undocumented persons in the U.S. are estimated to be in the U.S. workforce. 
Undocumented workers are strongly concentrated in low-skill and low-wage jobs. Note 
that “22% of the U.S. population age 25-64 with less than a high school education are 
unauthorized immigrants” (Passel and Cohn, p. 11, 2009), even though they comprise 
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only 3.72% of the U.S. population. This is a staggering statistic suggesting that 
undocumented persons make up a disproportionate share of the uneducated young adults 
in the U.S. In 2008, the labor force participation rate for male undocumented persons of 
94% exceeded that of men born in the U.S. At 58%, the labor force participation rate for 
female undocumented persons was lower than that of women born in the U.S. 
Undocumented households had a median annual household income of $36,000 in 2007, 
which was lower than the median U.S. household income of $50,000 (Passel and Cohn, 
2009). In 2003, undocumented families had an average yearly income of $27,400, 
whereas the corresponding figure for the U.S.-born families was $47,700 Passel (2005).  
Given that undocumented persons are barred from obtaining employment in the 
United States, one might wonder how they are able to work in the country. Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2011) discuss the relative lack of funding devoted to enforcement of 
immigration law in the interior of the United States and the lack of effective and 
consistent workplace enforcement following the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA). Undocumented persons have been able to work “under-the-table” in 
agriculture, day labor, and other areas. False Social Security numbers have allowed 
undocumented persons to obtain long-term employment. 
One may also wish to look at anecdotal data to see how undocumented persons 
have been able to attend college and obtain work in white-collar areas. Writing in The 
New York Times in June, 2011, Jose Antonio Vargas tells the story of his life as an 
undocumented person in the United States. He came from the Philippines when he was 
12 years old. His grandfather obtained a fake green card and a fake Filipino passport for 
him. He was able to attend college after finding a scholarship that “was not concerned 
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with” his “immigration status.” Using the fake passport, he obtained a Social Security 
card which he modified and later used to apply for an Oregon driver‟s license. The 
license was his key to obtaining an internship and a position as a reporter for The 
Washington Post. He later joined The Huffington Post. After growing tired of misleading 
his employers, he wrote his story for the New York Times. He had been aided in 
obtaining documents, internships, and employment by a network of teachers, friends, and 
coworkers throughout his life.  
The case of Adriana Sanchez is also instructive. Born in Mexico, she 
accompanied her family to California, where they overstayed their visas. She volunteered 
and worked several internships to pay tuition at California State University in Fresno 
where she earned a master‟s degree in International Relations. Sanchez works as an 
independent contractor for a nonprofit education organization and teaches English at a 
domestic violence shelter. Federal law “does not require those who hire independent 
contractors to ask for proof of immigration status.” Sanchez is like many young 
undocumented persons who have obtained college degrees and now seek various 
opportunities as independent contractors and in legal, political, and nonprofit fields 
(Wozniacka, 2012). 
Later, in section 5, I discuss how the children of undocumented persons impose 
costs on the education system in the United States. Therefore, it is important to have an 
estimate of the number of children of undocumented persons living in the country. Using 
estimates based on the March 2010 Supplements to the CPS, Passel and Cohn (2011) 
estimate that the 11.6 million undocumented persons include the parents of 4.5 million 
children (age 17 or younger) who were born in the U.S. and thus have U.S. citizenship, 
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and another million children who are not U.S. citizens and are therefore of undocumented 
status. Thus, in total, Passel and Cohn (2011) estimate that of the 11.6 million 
undocumented persons in 2010, one million are children, and, accounting for the 
documented (U.S. Citizen) children, the undocumented person families encompass an 
estimated 16 million persons in the U.S. (11.6 million undocumented persons and an 
additional 4.5 million U.S. Citizen children born to undocumented persons). Furthermore, 
undocumented persons were responsible for about 8% of all U.S. births between March 
2009 and March 2010, numbering around 350,000 newborns, and a similar number is 
estimated for 2008 – 2009. Recalling the geographic concentration of undocumented 
persons in just five U.S. states, these children will pose significant costs on those states‟ 
educational systems as they become school-age.  
 
3. Labor Market Factors 
Economic theory can shed light on the cause of undocumented immigration to the 
United States and the labor market effects of that immigration. When wages in one labor 
market are significantly higher than those in another, workers have an incentive to 
attempt to gain employment in the higher-wage market. Indeed, the wage gap between 
the United States and home countries (e.g. Mexico) is the primary reason for 
undocumented immigration (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2007). Undocumented persons are 
able to provide valuable assistance to their families in the home countries via remittances. 
On average, undocumented people have higher labor force participation rates than those 
born in the U.S. The majority of undocumented workers are employed in low-skill, low-
wage jobs. Mosisa (2002) found almost half of the labor force growth between 1996 and 
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2000 resulted from immigrant inflows, of which undocumented people made up one-third 
to one-half. 
Note that when workers enter (or exit) a lower-wage market, the wages in that 
market may decrease (or increase), as workers with various skill sets are more (or less) 
available. Immigration may have these effects on the labor markets in source and host 
countries. For example, Mishra (2007) finds that wages for a given skill group in Mexico 
increase by 4% when emigration causes a 10% decrease in the number of Mexican 
workers in that group. When workers enter a higher-wage market, wages in that market 
may be reduced. Since the majority of undocumented workers work in low-skill 
occupations, there has been concern that, either via reduction in wages or crowding-out, 
undocumented immigration hurts low-skill U.S.-born workers. There is a lack of 
consensus in the literature over this point. Borjas (2003) states that wages among U.S.-
born high school dropouts fell 9% during the 1980s and 1990s because of low-skill 
immigration. On the other hand, Hanson et al. (2002) find that the wages of low-skill 
native-born U.S. workers are not significantly adversely affected by undocumented 
immigration. Furthermore, other studies have not found evidence that undocumented 
immigration has caused higher unemployment among U.S.-born low-skill workers.  
We might also expect undocumented immigration to raise the wages of those 
working in high-skilled jobs.  This occurs when undocumented workers “complement the 
skills of American workers and businesses, increasing their productivity on the job and 
raising their wages” (Greenstone, Looney, and Marks, p. 4, 2012). Uncodumented 
workers may also facilitate increased participation in the labor market by high-skilled 
workers by performing household services and other work for them at a lower cost than if 
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documented workers were hired for these tasks. Using the integrated Public Use 
Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey 
(ACS), Ottaviano and Peri (2008) find that immigration raises wages of U.S. – born 
workers a small amount on aggregate. 
 
4. Review of U.S. Legislation 
Undocumented persons‟ status and ability to pursue steps towards legalization 
depend on immigration legislation in effect in the United States. The last major 
legislation that included a large-scale amnesty in the United States was passed in 1986 
and signed into law by President Reagan. Three large-scale amnesty measures have been 
put forward since then. In this section, I discuss the details of U.S. immigration 
legislation passed or debated in or after 1986 that have a large-scale amnesty provision. I 
discuss each of these four measures in turn. At the conclusions of this section, I provide a 
summary of the common features of these efforts.  
First, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) is the most recent 
large-scale amnesty measure passed in the United States.
1
 It was enacted November 6, 
1986 and provided amnesty through two programs, the Legally Authorized Workers 
(LAW) program and the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program. LAW allowed 
undocumented persons to apply for temporary legal residency if they had been living 
continuously in the United States since January 1, 1982. Persons demonstrating 
knowledge of the English language, basic citizenship skills, and continuous residence 
                                                 
1
 Background information on IRCA and the other three amnesty measures is drawn from The Library of 
Congress Thomas database of legislative information.  
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within 18 months of being granted temporary status would have their status adjusted to 
legal permanent resident. Undocumented persons who qualified for LAW needed to 
apply between May 5, 1987 and May 4, 1988. SAW extended temporary permanent 
resident status to undocumented persons who worked at least 90 days in U.S. agriculture 
during each of the previous three years or who worked at least 90 days during the past 
year. Successful SAW applicants could have their status adjusted to legal permanent 
resident in one to two years. Undocumented persons who qualified for SAW needed to 
apply between May 5, 1987 and November 30, 1988 (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2003).  
IRCA also requires employers to verify legal status when hiring employees, and 
employees are required to attest to legal work status. IRCA stipulates that it is unlawful to 
knowingly hire persons lacking legal work status, or to continue to employ persons 
discovered to be unauthorized to work in the U.S. IRCA authorizes penalties against 
employers violating these provisions. IRCA also authorized increased funding for the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Border Patrol. IRCA prohibited Visa 
violators from having their status changed to permanent resident (U.S. Library of 
Congress, Thomas, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).   
Second, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (CIRA) marks the 
beginning of recent attempts at large-scale amnesties. CIRA was passed in the Senate on 
May 25, 2006, but it was not enacted and is not a law because a conference committee 
was unable to resolve differences with another immigration bill passed in the House. 
Rather than attempt to remove long-term undocumented persons from the country, CIRA 
would have granted permanent resident status to individuals continuously present in the 
United States since April 5, 2001.  Applicants would have been required to show they 
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had been employed at least three of the five years from 2001-2005, with certain 
exceptions. CIRA was intended to be similar to IRCA in the sense of requirements for 
background checks and “basic citizenship skills.” Applicants would also have been 
required to pay a $2,000 fine and make arrangements to pay any back taxes (U.S. Library 
of Congress, Thomas, Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006). 
CIRA would have required undocumented persons with less than two years 
residence to depart the United States. Those with between two and five years residence 
would be granted deferred mandatory departure but be required to depart the U.S. within 
three years. Persons falling into either group would be allowed to seek legal readmission. 
CIRA would have created a new H-2C Visa providing up to six years of temporary legal 
residence for up to 200,000 workers annually.  CIRA would have also provided for 
various enhancements along the border and funding for equipment and personnel for the 
Border Patrol (National Conference of State Legislatures, Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Act of 2006). 
Third, often referred to in the popular press, one of the most well-known 
initiatives for amnesty during the last decade has been the Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act). The DREAM Act was originally 
introduced by U.S. Senators Richard Durbin and Orrin Hatch in 2001. It has been 
adjusted and reintroduced several times. The DREAM Act was last introduced in the 
Senate in 2011. The 2011 version of the DREAM Act was not passed, but would have 
extended conditional permanent resident status to undocumented persons who entered the 
United States on or before their 15th birthday and had been continuously present in the 
United States during the five years previous to the passage of the Act. Persons must have 
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been younger than 36 years of age. Persons must demonstrate “good moral character,” 
meaning they have not been convicted of serious crimes or three or more lesser offenses. 
They must have earned a high school diploma or GED or been admitted to a college or 
university. Persons meeting these requirements would be granted conditional permanent 
resident status for a period of six years. The conditional basis of the status would be 
removed for persons who earn a college degree or complete at least two years of study 
towards a bachelor‟s or higher degree, or who complete two years‟ service in the U.S. 
Armed Forces (U.S. Library of Congress, Thomas, Dream Act of 2011). 
Fourth, the most recent amnesty action taken in the United States is Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an executive order issued by President Obama 
on June 15, 2012. DACA has many provisions which are similar to the Dream Act, but it 
does not grant legal resident status to undocumented persons. Those who meet the 
provisions of the program are granted a two year period of “deferred action,” time during 
which they will not be deported and can receive temporary work authorization. In order 
to qualify, individuals must have entered the United States before reaching their 16th 
birthday, have continuously resided in the U.S. since June 15, 2007, and have been 
present in the United States on June 15, 2012 and the date of their application for DACA. 
Individuals must be under age 31 as of June 15, 2012. Like IRCA and CIRA, DACA also 
carries provisions requiring “basic citizenship skills” and “good moral character,” 
meaning that individuals must not have been convicted of a felony, serious misdemeanor, 
or three or more other misdemeanors, and must not pose any other threat to national 
security or public safety. Individuals must be in school, have completed high school or a 
GED, or be an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S. Armed Forces or Coast Guard. 
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An individual must be at least 15 years of age to request deferred action, unless currently 
in removal proceedings, in which case the individual may submit the request while less 
than 15 years of age. An individual receiving deferred action may apply for it to be 
renewed when the two years expires (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process). 
In Table 1, I summarize the details of these measures. I highlight the common 
provisions outlined by the measures in regards to who may qualify for amnesty under the 
respective bills. Referring to Table 1, we see that all four measures require proof of 
residency for several years prior to receiving amnesty consideration. In addition, each of 
the measures requires that the undocumented person be of “good moral character.” 
Two more pieces of legislation pertaining to undocumented persons were signed 
into law by President Bill Clinton. These measures do not provide any form of amnesty, 
but are important for the purposes of my paper because they contained provisions 
restricting access to federal welfare benefits and social security by undocumented 
persons. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) passed the House and Senate in July 1996 and was signed by President 
Clinton in August 1996. This bill affects the fiscal impact undocumented persons have on 
government budgets because it prevents Medicaid, food stamps, and cash welfare from 
being received by non-refugee undocumented persons as well as documented persons 
unless they are naturalized U.S. citizens (U.S. Library of Congress, Thomas, Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). According to 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2007), “PRWORA had little effect on undocumented immigrants, 
who were already ineligible for most welfare programs” (p. 7). 
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The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was 
enacted September 30, 1996 as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act. It 
provided funding for equipment and technology along the border and an increase in the 
number of INS agents during the late 1990s and early 2000s. It also makes undocumented 
persons ineligible for Social Security benefits. Section 346 of Subtitle C “makes an alien 
inadmissible for five years for student visa violations.” In perhaps the two most important 
provisions for undocumented persons, the law stipulated the legal route which 
undocumented persons may use to attempt to legalize their status, but this route is not an 
amnesty. The first provision states that adult undocumented persons present in the United 
States between 180 days and 365 days must voluntarily depart the U.S. and wait three 
years before seeking legal readmission. The second states that adult undocumented 
persons present in the U.S. 365 or more days must voluntarily depart the U.S. and wait 10 
years before seeking legal readmission (Government Printing Office, Public Law 104-
208). Clearly, it is not in an undocumented person‟s self-interest to self-report and 
voluntarily depart the United States for either three or 10 years. Mary Giovagnoli, 
Director of the Immigration Policy Center, stated in 2009 that undocumented persons are 
encouraged to hide from the legal system by the enforcement of IIRIRA (qtd. in Smith). 
The DREAM Act and DACA are representative of the growing political pressure 
for immigration reform in the United States. The DREAM Act and DACA are very 
similar to each other and their provisions are similar to those of CIRA, while having a 
few common goals with the provisions of IRCA. However, the DREAM Act and DACA 
mark a considerable departure from IRCA, PRWORA, and IIRIRA. Border Patrol and 
border improvements funding are not of primary concern, and the DREAM Act and 
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DACA are not intended to remove undocumented persons from the country. The 
DREAM Act and DACA are an attempt to bring young, educated undocumented persons 
into the U.S. labor force for the long term.  
 
5. Undocumented Persons and the Structure of U.S. Government 
Undocumented persons have a unique relationship with the various levels of 
government in the United States. In order to understand the impact undocumented 
persons have on federal, state, and local budgets, it is useful to review basic expenditures 
and sources of revenue at these different levels of government. (See Rosen and Gayer, 
2010, for the structure of state and local government). While not eligible to receive all the 
benefits that government provides, undocumented persons and/or their children receive 
some government services. In Figure 1, I summarize the possible fiscal impacts of 
undocumented persons. Looking to the top of Figure 1, we see that undocumented 
persons can have an impact on expenditure and revenue streams at the federal level. The 
federal government services the national debt, provides goods such as national defense 
and national parks, and provides funding for education, state Medicaid programs 
(healthcare for the poor), and other public welfare activities. The federal government 
administers the U.S. public retirement programs of Social Security and Medicare.
2
 It 
funds its spending in these areas by collecting the personal income tax, payroll tax, 
corporate tax, and excise taxes. Note that the payroll tax (or more formally, Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax), is earmarked to exclusively fund the U.S. 
                                                 
2
 As noted in section 4, undocumented persons cannot presently receive benefits from these programs, but 
they may be able to do in the future if they receive amnesty. 
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public retirement programs of Social Security and Medicare. Note also, that the largest 
federal revenue sources are personal income and payroll taxes, amounting to 81% of 
federal revenues in 2008 (Rosen and Gayer, 2010).  
On the revenue side, research indicates that undocumented persons pay federal 
income taxes and payroll taxes. Feinleib and Warner (2005) report that the Social 
Security Administration estimates that about one half of undocumented persons pay 
payroll taxes. Personal federal income tax returns are filed by about 6 million 
undocumented persons each year, according to IRS estimates (Singer and Dodd-Major, 
2004). To put this number in perspective, recall from Section 2 that an estimated 8 
million undocumented persons are in the workforce. Thus, we can state that an estimated 
75% of undocumented persons in the U.S. workforce pay federal personal income taxes. 
Interestingly, both payroll and personal income taxes are withheld from paychecks, yet 
the percentage paying personal income taxes is estimated to be higher than the percentage 
paying FICA.  
On the federal expenditure side, undocumented persons are barred (according to 
legislative action in the form of PRWORA and IIRIRA) from receiving benefits through 
Social Security, Medicaid, Medicare, or welfare. However, they do benefit from the 
national security provided by the federal government. Yet the government also spends 
money on deportation of undocumented persons. Thus undocumented persons help 
finance federal government expenditures to have them detected and deported. 
Undocumented persons also benefit from federal expenditures on a number of goods and 
services, including the federal funds that go to states for education, child care programs 
and some health care programs. If undocumented persons receive amnesty, they could 
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potentially become eligible for Social Security benefits. However, many undocumented 
workers make contributions to fictitious accounts using false social security numbers, and 
these undocumented workers would thus not be able to claim benefits.  
Referring to Figure 1, we note the possible fiscal impact at the state level. State 
governments provide kindergarten through 12th grade education and fund public 
universities. They provide hospitals and law enforcement services such as the Highway 
Patrol. At the bottom of figure 1, we see possible fiscal effects at the local level. Local 
governments provide funding for K-12 education and fund county hospitals. They fund 
sheriffs‟ offices at the county level and police and fire departments at the local level.  
State and local governments are not allowed to prevent children from attending 
public schools based on their immigration status. Undocumented persons also benefit 
from public hospitals, which must provide emergency services to them regardless of the 
patient‟s ability to pay if they accept Medicare or Medicaid funding. Undocumented 
persons make use of roads and highways. Those undocumented persons who have trouble 
with the law impose costs on local law enforcement.  
State and local governments fund these activities through personal income taxes, 
sales taxes, property taxes, and grants from the federal government. Of these, property 
taxes, sales taxes, and federal government grants are the biggest source of state and local 
government revenues, amounting to about 55% in 2008 (Rosen and Gayer, 2010). All 
three of these are paid by undocumented persons. Reporting on a study by the Institute 
for Taxation and Economic Policy, the Immigration Policy Center states that 
undocumented immigrant households paid $11.2 billion in state and local taxes in 2010. 
Of that amount, “$1.2 billion was paid in personal income taxes, $1.6 billion was paid in 
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property taxes, and $8.4 billion was paid in in sales taxes” (Immigration Policy Center, 
2011). Tsoodle and Turner (2008) report that when property taxes are raised, part of the 
increased cost to landlords is passed on to tenants in the form of higher rents. Thus, 
undocumented persons pay some property taxes even if they are renters. Undocumented 
persons make contributions to state and local budgets via their federal income taxes, 
which are used for federal grants to state and local governments. 20% of state and local 
government funding is sourced from grants from the federal government (Rosen and 
Gayer, 2010). 
 
6. Empirical Evidence 
While there are many papers on immigration, a search of the literature reveals few 
studies on the topic of undocumented persons and state and local fiscal impacts. 
Greenstone et al. (2012), in a Brookings Institution framing memo, confirm this by the 
few studies they cite on the topic of immigration and fiscal impacts. Generally, 
Greenstone et al. suggest the fiscal effects can be large and geographically concentrated. 
In this section, I review three papers that confirm this and provide direct evidence of the 
fiscal impacts of immigrants. 
Congressional Budget Office Estimates 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2007) provides evidence on the extent to 
which the costs incurred by state and local governments for providing public services to 
undocumented persons are balanced by the tax revenues paid to those governments by 
their undocumented populations. To do so, CBO provides a series of examples from 
specific states, counties or groups of counties, and metropolitan areas in regard to costs 
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accumulated by providing undocumented persons with public services. These are 
followed by examples concerning comparisons of public services costs with tax revenues. 
The CBO begins with examples of the costs of public services, including education, 
health care, and law enforcement. I will now discuss these CBO examples in turn. It is 
important to note that stipulations in federal programs and court rulings at the state and 
federal level prevent states from evading costs by refusing to provide public services to 
undocumented persons. Moreover, it is useful to keep in mind that the estimated spending 
on undocumented persons represents a small portion of state and local budgets for most 
states.  
The CBO notes that states may not exclude undocumented children from public 
education, and estimates that about 5 million children of undocumented persons are 
school-age children (note that this number is consistent with the estimated 5.5 million 
children noted in Passel and Cohn, 2011). To understand the costs facing states to fund 
education, the CBO considers Minnesota and New Mexico. In 2004, the Minnesota 
Department of Administration estimated total state and local spending of between $118 
million and $157 million to educate children of undocumented persons. Analysts in New 
Mexico reported that the state spent $67 million to educate 9,200 undocumented children 
during the 2003 – 2004 school year. It is a useful exercise to use the numbers from New 
Mexico, to estimate a per child cost of $7,282 per year. Combining this with the CBO 
number of 5 million school age children, a back of the envelope national estimate would 
be a cost of $36.4 billion dollars annually.  
CBO gave two examples in terms of health care costs. The United States/Mexico 
Border Counties Coalition reported that “county governments that share a border with 
20 
 
Mexico incurred almost $190 million in costs for providing care to unauthorized 
immigrants” in 2000 (p. 8). The Oklahoma Health Care Authority estimated in 2006 that 
emergency Medicaid services for undocumented persons would cost about $9.7 million 
for that year. Childbirth was expected to account for 80% of those costs.  
Law enforcement examples included a statistic from the United States/Mexico 
Border Counties Coalition, which reported a total cost in 1999 of more than $108 million 
for law enforcement activities involving undocumented people in counties sharing a 
border with Mexico. San Diego County spent over $50 million of that amount. What 
these examples suggest is that the state and local expenditures on undocumented persons 
can be sizable, especially along the Mexico – U.S. border. 
Another way to gauge the possible costs of undocumented persons for state and 
local governments is to focus on net costs, that is, compare the costs of providing public 
services with tax revenues received. The CBO provides four examples that are for 
different years and states, all suggesting that the estimated state and local taxes collected 
from undocumented persons fall short of the estimated fiscal costs at the state and local 
level. Let us now go through these examples, starting with the case of New Mexico. The 
CBO cites the New Mexico Fiscal Policy Project, which reported in 2006 that the state 
collects about $1 to $2 million more than it spends on public education for undocumented 
children each year. Note that this comparison does not include health care or law 
enforcement costs, however. In another example, the CBO reports that Colorado spends 
between $217 and $225 million on these three public services for undocumented persons, 
while taxes collected from undocumented persons at both the state and local levels were 
between $159 and $194 million each year (p. 9). So, even assuming taxes at the high end 
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and spending at the low end, Colorado has a shortfall of $23 million. In 2006, the state 
comptroller of Texas estimated that tax revenue exceeded the costs of undocumented 
persons by $424 million, but, the evidence was mixed, as a separate report found that 
Texas hospitals incurred $1.3 billion in uncompensated health care costs while serving 
undocumented persons in 2004. Finally, the CBO report data for Iowa, suggesting a net 
cost in 2004.  
Thus, in answer to the net budget impact question, the CBO concludes that the 
cost of services provided to undocumented persons exceed the tax revenues they pay to 
state and local governments. Finally, the CBO reports that some of the costs of 
undocumented persons are defrayed by federal transfers to cover up costs, but, on net, 
states do not receive enough to cover the shortfall. Note that the CBO study does not 
imply that undocumented people impose strong negative fiscal impacts in every state and 
locality, but the states where they are concentrated experience negative fiscal impacts. 
The CBO report, however, does not take into account the block grants and other transfers 
from the federal government for non-undocumented persons purposes. Doing so may 
help to reduce the estimated shortfalls as these grants are a transfer of federal tax dollars 
(raised in part from undocumented persons) to the states.  
Lee and Miller (1997) 
Lee and Miller (1997) estimate long-term fiscal impacts of various categories of 
immigrants at both the federal and state and local levels. Lee and Miller argue that we 
cannot gain a complete understanding of the fiscal impacts of immigrants by looking at 
“static” calculations of the value of taxes paid and benefits received by immigrants at a 
point in time. A weakness of static calculations is that they group different immigrant 
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generations together when calculating fiscal impacts. “If, for example, elderly immigrants 
generally have had a higher level of income than younger, more recent immigrants, then 
the ratio of their Social Security benefits to the payroll taxes of the new immigrants will 
overstate the ratio based on the benefits and taxes of either group separately” (p. 297), so 
cohort effects need to be accounted for. Moreover, static calculations do not account for 
possible future changes in taxation or benefit rules, so they cannot be expected to reflect 
immigrants‟ contributions or benefit costs throughout life. Finally, static calculations do 
not control for the changing nature of the age structure of the population of immigrants or 
discount future tax revenue or benefit flows. For example, if the cohort of school-age 
immigrants is larger in size relative to the cohort of working-age immigrants, the cost of 
educational expenditures will be overstated relative to the revenue from income taxes. 
However, the younger cohort will have its future tax revenues overstated in relation to its 
educational expenditures because of the failure to discount future income taxes in static 
analysis.  
Lee and Miller use sample data from the March 1994 and 1995 Current 
Population Surveys (CPS) to estimate age profiles by educational level, immigrant 
generation, and, for immigrants, time since arrival, of taxes and benefits received. U.S. 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) are used to adjust the age profiles to 
match U.S. population totals. The age profiles of benefits describe annual amounts of 
benefits received under any of 25 federal, state, and local programs by age and immigrant 
generation. Age profiles of taxes describe the annual tax revenues paid through federal 
income taxes, payroll taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes, by age and immigrant 
generation.    
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Lee and Miller define a baseline scenario under which they will examine the net 
present values of the fiscal impacts of immigrants. They make various assumptions in the 
baseline scenario, such as a constant GDP/debt ratio. The age profiles are used to 
estimate the net present values (NPV) of taxes paid and benefits received by additional 
immigrants and their descendants, out to periods as long as 300 years. Lee and Miller use 
these NPVs to represent the total fiscal impact of an additional immigrant. Lee and Miller 
calculate NPV at the federal, state, and total levels. Immigrants arriving at different ages 
and with different education levels will have different impacts. For example, an 
immigrant arriving at age 21 with a high school education has an NPV of $126,000. An 
immigrant arriving with a high education level (beyond high school) at age 70 has a 
negative NPV of -$148,000 (Lee and Miller, p. 327 – 328, 1997). 
Lee and Miller find that, limiting the results to federal tax revenues and benefit 
costs, all immigrants arriving before about the age of 30 have a positive NPV at the 
federal level. High education immigrants have a positive NPV until age of arrival in the 
late 40s, when they may not have many working years left in which to contribute taxes. 
At the state level, immigrants with less than a high school education have a negative NPV 
regardless of the age of arrival. High education immigrants arriving between 20 and 40 
and high-school educated immigrants arriving between 35 and 55 have a positive NPV. 
This is largely because states did not need to pay the costs of their education, but still 
receive tax benefits (Lee and Miller, p. 330 – 331, 1997). 
When disaggregation is limited to age at arrival and education level is not 
considered, immigrants have a positive total and federal NPV as long as they arrive 
before age 40, the NPV is always negative thereafter. The state NPV is only positive for 
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arrival between the late 20s and late 40s. Lee and Miller estimate that the average overall 
NPV of an immigrant is positive in the amount of $80,000. If overall NPVs are 
disaggregated only by education level, the overall NPV of an immigrant with less than a 
high school education is -$13,000. With a high school education, NPV is $51,000, and 
with high education it is $198,000 (Lee and Miller, p. 334 – 335, 1997). The overall 
positive net contribution of $80,000 found by Lee and Miller is confirmed by Hanson 
(2005), who evaluates the total net contributions of immigrants and their descendants (as 
cited in Greenstone et al., 2012).  
As noted in Section 5, state and local governments bear heavy costs of educating 
the children of immigrants, and this explains why NPVs are almost always negative at the 
state level and significantly positive at the federal level. This education enables these 
children to gain employment when they reach working age, and they pay taxes based on 
their earnings. However, the federal government receives the majority of tax revenues 
these individuals pay. In a sense, the federal government reaps the rewards of the state 
and local governments‟ investment. Since a person “pays” for the education benefits they 
receive as youngsters later in life, discounting reduces future taxes value relative to 
benefits, making the NPV more negative. This occurs in the state level calculations. In 
the federal level calculations, a person pays taxes throughout the working life for benefits 
they receive many years later, and discounting reduces the value of these benefits relative 
to the taxes paid (Lee and Miller, p. 347 – 348, 1997). 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2011) 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2011) examine the likely economic consequences of a 
future amnesty program. In order to do so, they explain the effects of the Immigration 
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Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which granted amnesty to 2.7 million 
undocumented persons. Orrenius and Zavodny then comment on what design aspects 
might make a future amnesty program successful in terms of impacts on the populations 
concerned and reducing future illegal immigration.  
The LAW and SAW programs were plagued by “lax verification of 
documents…and complex residency requirements” (Orrenius and Zavodny, p. 20, 2007), 
and were subject to fraud. For example, over 1 million people were granted legal resident 
status under the SAW program, while the number of those who were thought to qualify 
was about 300,000 (Passel, p. 33 – 34, 1999). After conducting surveys in fifty 
communities in Mexico, Donato and Carter (1999) estimated that about 73% of persons 
included in their sample who had filed LAW applications had done so fraudulently, while 
40% of those who filed SAW applications had done so fraudulently. 
Orrenius and Zavodny (2011) argue that IRCA was not successful in slowing 
undocumented immigration. Using Border Patrol apprehensions as a proxy for illegal 
crossings, they find that apprehensions took a temporary downturn after IRCA was 
passed, but returned to their long-term growth trend after a few years. “Since IRCA 
legalized a huge fraction of the undocumented population, people who formerly crossed 
illegally were able to cross legally. Since over 2 million Mexican migrants were 
legalized, illegal immigration along the Southwest border should have slowed more than 
it did” (p. 89). They also argue that although undocumented immigration along the border 
slowed for a few years after 1986, “giving an almost universal amnesty to undocumented 
immigrants did not alter long-run patterns of illegal immigration, which some believed it 
would” (p. 90 – 91). 
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Other problems with IRCA discussed by Orrenius and Zavodny involved the 
enforcement scheme that took shape after the bill was passed. Increased funding for 
Border Patrol has not translated to increased effectiveness at preventing illegal border 
crossing. Relatively little funds are devoted to interior enforcement. Undocumented 
persons are less able to engage in circular migration, the practice of entering and leaving 
the United States on a periodic basis, which once “composed more than 50 percent of the 
flow of undocumented Mexican immigrants” (Orrenius and Zavodny, p. 18, 2007). This 
means that they will “contribute to the unemployment pool” when out of work and that 
their relatives are more likely to attempt to enter the United States.  
Orrenius and Zavodny report that Social Security Administration letters to 
employers with lists of employees who provided Social Security numbers that did not 
match led to economic costs for undocumented people, who were dismissed from jobs or 
quit jobs for fear that the government would follow up with arrests at their workplaces. 
Economic costs extended to employers, who lost workers, and for legal workers, who 
were discriminated against by employers. Actual workplace enforcement was weak. 
IRCA did not address the wage gap motivation for migration to the U.S., and lack of 
interior enforcement meant that job availability was still a motivating factor for migrants. 
Orrenius and Zavodny argue that an effective amnesty program will be one that 
encourages the socioeconomic success and assimilation of undocumented people. “Legal 
status might lead to skill attainment and economic advancement” (p. 15). This should 
allow the formerly undocumented to “accumulate more human capital and contribute to 
the tax base,” especially in future generations (p. 18). Their eligibility for welfare 
programs could be restricted so that they do not contribute to increased costs. Any new 
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amnesty should include several aspects. Strict document verification, simple residency 
requirements, and background checks would reduce fraud and address security concerns.   
An amnesty program should include a strong focus on internal enforcement. It should 
also include “a low-cost, reliable way for employers to verify legal work status” and 
tougher workplace enforcement. Orrenius and Zavodny recommend a guest worker 
program as a means to “reduce undocumented migration motivated by economic 
considerations” (p. 22). The program must give workers incentives to return home when 
their guest period expires. Better internal and workplace enforcement and a guest worker 
program should help to address the wage gap issue and the motivation to immigrate 
illegally due to availability of jobs preferable to those available in source countries. In 
combination with strict enforcement of status verification, a guest worker program would 
reduce demand for undocumented workers. 
 
7. Immigration and Economic Growth 
Before attempting to answer the question of whether an amnesty is likely to be 
beneficial or detrimental to government finances, it will be useful to review the basic 
sources of economic growth and how amnesty, and immigration in general, should 
interact with them according to economic theory. As noted in any introductory textbook, 
such as O‟Sullivan, Sheffrin, and Perez (2008), the size of the economy is limited by its 
factors of production. The natural resources available in a country influence choice 
bundles of goods possible in a country. The labor force in a country also affects 
production possibilities. Capital is required to produce goods and the amount and types of 
capital available affect production possibilities. The abilities of the labor force are 
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enhanced through human capital, i.e., the knowledge and skills of workers. Technology 
enhances the productivity of labor and capital. Entrepreneurship, the ability to organize 
combinations of these factors to bring valuable products to market, also contributes to the 
size of the economy (O‟Sullivan, Sheffrin, and Perez, 2008). 
Ceteris paribus, the economy can be expected to grow when any one of these 
factors of production becomes more abundant. The discovery of new oil deposits may 
spur growth by decreasing the cost of gas. Growth in the labor force provides more 
workers for producing goods and services. Investment in capital stock makes more or 
newer physical assets available for production. Growth in human capital makes workers 
more efficient and productive and allows them to work on knowledge based products and 
services. Growth in technology makes capital and labor more efficient, increases 
productivity, and makes new products and services possible. When an entrepreneur 
combines factors of production to offer a new product or service or offer an existing 
product or service more efficiently, jobs can be created and economic growth occurs. 
In what ways might undocumented persons, or their legalization, affect the 
different factors of production? We already know that undocumented workers account for 
a large part of the labor force growth in recent years. Although they are concentrated in 
low-skill jobs, they do have knowledge and skills necessary to perform work in the areas 
where they are employed. For example, there is a heavy demand for such workers in 
agriculture. Undocumented workers are already providing a necessary skill set in the U.S. 
economy.  
An amnesty is likely to allow for increased abundance in the factors of 
production. The formerly undocumented will have easier access to higher levels of 
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education after an amnesty. They will not only contribute to labor force growth, but also 
bring higher levels of human capital to the labor market. Immigrants are likely to make 
positive contributions to technological growth and entrepreneurship growth. Wadhwa et 
al. (2012) find that 24.3% of the technology companies founded in the United States 
between 2006 and 2012 had least one immigrant founder. Among Silicon Valley 
technology companies, the proportion is 43.9%. The Fiscal Policy Institute (2012) reports 
that 18% of small business owners are immigrants, while immigrants comprise only 13% 
of the overall population. Legalization makes greater access to education available for the 
undocumented population, increasing human capital as they enter the labor market. 
Attaining higher levels of education may also allow formerly undocumented persons to 
contribute to technology growth and to pursue entrepreneurial activities. Amnesty has 
thus the strong potential to spur economic growth. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, I document what is known about the characteristics of 
undocumented persons, their impacts on federal, state and local governments, and past 
efforts to provide some form of amnesty. In terms of net revenue impact, when looking at 
CBO (2007), we see that overall, undocumented persons tend to have a negative effect on 
state finances, with few exceptions. This is particularly true for states with high 
concentrations of undocumented persons. CBO (2007) provides examples of these 
negative fiscal effects. A successful amnesty program would thus need to help offset the 
education costs in states with a concentration of undocumented persons. 
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Lee and Miller (1997) is general to immigrants, both documented and 
undocumented, so how do we use it learn about the fiscal effects of undocumented 
immigrants and how those impacts may change after amnesty? On overage, immigrants 
have a positive federal fiscal impact. This is true for undocumented persons. An 
aforementioned statistic estimates that about 75% of undocumented persons file income 
tax returns, but under current law they will not be able to receive benefits later in life. 
Also, persons who are legalized will only be able to receive Social Security benefits 
stemming from working years that follow legalization. Persons will not be able to receive 
benefits stemming from working years when they were paying income and payroll taxes 
to fictitious accounts using false social security numbers. After amnesty, many currently 
undocumented persons will eventually qualify for benefits from the federal government. 
However, legalization will allow more young immigrants to obtain financial aid and 
attend colleges and universities, and the ability to complete employer verifications will 
allow them to obtain more and better jobs. Legalization should result in higher income 
and payroll tax compliance rates and higher tax revenues resulting from higher 
educational attainment and earnings among the population of formerly undocumented 
persons. Lee and Miller (2007) indicate that young immigrants with high education levels 
have a highly positive NPV at the federal and combined state and federal levels. 
Considering the recent legislation, it is clear that the DREAM Act and DACA are 
aimed at those undocumented persons who are most likely to provide a positive fiscal 
impact at the federal and total levels. Persons who arrived in the United States early in 
life and who pursue education beyond high school are those with the highest net present 
values in the Lee and Miller (2007) study. Lee and Miller (1997) and other studies show 
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that it makes good fiscal sense to legalize young undocumented persons who have or will 
pursue higher education. If the only goal of legislation for undocumented persons is to 
maximize positive budgetary impacts and to avoid costs, the DREAM Act or DACA 
could be viewed as sufficient answers to the question of the undocumented population if 
accompanied by measures to remove those who do not qualify from the country and 
ensure compliance. However, such a policy would not address the wage gap between the 
United States and sending countries that is the primary cause for undocumented 
immigration. Given that (Lee and Miller, 1997; Hanson, 2005) on average, immigrants 
have a positive total fiscal impact and are a net benefit, I hypothesize that we can afford 
to extend amnesty to the entire undocumented population, and avoid the problem of 
attempting to separate the upwardly educationally mobile young undocumented 
population from their parents and other relatives.  
To address the fiscal burden born by states funding education for the population 
of young undocumented persons, Greenstone et al. (2012) suggest that “one way to 
remedy the unfair distribution of costs for immigrants would be to offset the costs to 
heavily impacted states using the aggregate gains that accrue elsewhere. This would also 
serve to decrease some of the political tension surrounding the immigration issue in many 
states” (Greenstone et al, p. 6, 2012). Given the strongly positive NPVs of federal fiscal 
impacts of immigrants, perhaps a program could be devised by which the federal 
government would subsidize states providing education to young immigrants, weighted 
by population. 
An interesting question that has not yet been fleshed out by the literature is 
whether, when compared with U.S. citizens of similar characteristics, undocumented 
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persons contribute relatively more to the U.S. economy. Because of the potentially higher 
costs they face if arrested (i.e. deportation), undocumented persons may be less likely 
than similarly-situated U.S. citizens to commit crimes to begin with. It may be that 
enforcement costs for undocumented persons are lower than for U.S. citizens of similar 
socioeconomic status once Border Patrol costs are subtracted. As such, estimates like the 
CBO‟s on law enforcement may be skewed upwards.  
Amnesty is positively correlated with the factors of production. It should also 
result in higher tax revenues at the different levels of government, although it will 
eventually mean that there may be additional public service costs for the formerly 
undocumented. It makes good fiscal sense to extend amnesty to the undocumented 
population that is young and educated, and Lee and Miller (1997) reveal that there is a 
fiscal argument that we can afford to extend amnesty to the rest of the undocumented 
population along with them. Through its ability to move people from the population of 
undocumented immigrants into the population of legal immigrants, amnesty will likely 
generate benefits in terms of economic growth and move the fiscal impacts of 
undocumented immigrants in a positive direction through higher tax revenues and a net 
positive impact on government budgets. 
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Table 1. U.S. Amnesty Legislation Summary 
Legislation Immigration Reform 
and Control Act  
(IRCA) (1986) 
Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act 
(CIRA) (2006) 
DREAM Act  
(2011) 
Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) (June 15, 2012) 
Status Signed by Pres. Reagan Failed to pass Failed to pass Executive Order 
 Requirements 
Residency LAW: Living 
continuously in the U.S. 
since January 1, 1982 or  
 
SAW: Satisfy 
employment requirement 
below 
Must have been 
continuously present since 
April 5, 2001 
Must have entered 
the U.S. on or before 
15
th
 birthday. 
 
Must have 
continuously resided 
in the U.S. during 
the five years prior 
to passage of the 
Act.  
Must have entered the U.S. 
before reaching 16
th
 
birthday 
 
Must have continuously 
resided in the U.S. since 
June 15, 2007 
 
Must have been present in 
the U.S. on June 15, 2012 
and the date of application 
 
Must have entered without 
inspection before June 15, 
2012, or lawful immigration 
status expired as of that 
date.  
Employment SAW: Must have worked 
at least 90 days in U.S. 
agriculture during each of 
the previous three years or 
at least 90 days during the 
past year 
At least 3 of 5 yrs. From 
2001 – 2005 (with 
exceptions) 
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Table 1. U.S. 
Amnesty Legislation 
Summary (Cont.) 
IRCA (1986) CIRA (2006) DREAM Act (2011) DACA (2012) 
Age   Must be under 36 years of 
age at the time of passage of 
the act 
Be under age 31 as of 
June 15, 2012 
Education   Must have graduated from a 
U.S. high school, obtained a 
GED, or gained admission 
to a college or university 
Must be in school, have 
completed high school 
or a GED, or be an 
honorably discharged 
veteran of the U.S. 
Armed Forces or Coast 
Guard 
“Character” Must not have been 
convicted of a felony or 
three or more 
misdemeanors 
Must undergo 
background checks 
and demonstrate 
“basic citizenship 
skills” 
Must complete background 
checks and a medical 
examination and possess 
“good moral character” 
 
Must be registered with the 
Selective Service if male 
Must not have been 
convicted of a felony, 
serious misdemeanor, or 
three or more other 
misdemeanors, and do 
not pose any other threat 
to national security or 
public safety 
Fines  $2,000 (and agreement 
to pay back taxes) 
  
Additional Details:     
  Gaining Permanent           
Legal Residence 
Demonstrate knowledge 
of English, knowledge of 
American civics, and 
continuous residence 
within 18 months of being 
granted temporary status 
 Those granted conditional 
permanent resident status 
pursuant to Dream Act 
could have conditional basis 
removed upon completion 
of one of the following: 
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Table 1. U.S. 
Amnesty Legislation 
Summary (Cont.) 
IRCA (1986) CIRA (2006) DREAM Act (2011) DACA (2012) 
Gaining Permanent 
Legal Residence 
(Continued) 
   A degree from a 
U.S. college or 
university 
 Two years study 
towards a 
bachelors or higher 
degree 
 Two years service 
in the U.S. Armed 
Forces 
 
  General 
Information 
   An individual must be at 
least 15 years of age to 
request deferred action, 
unless currently in removal 
proceedings, in which case 
the individual may submit 
the request while less than 
15 years of age.  
  Application Period LAW: May 5, 1987 –       
May 4, 1988 
 
SAW: May 5, 1987 –  
           Nov. 30, 1988 
 Persons must apply within 
one year of the latter of 
earning a high school 
diploma (or GED) or the 
Act‟s enactment 
No deadline for persons 
who meet requirements. 
Note: Not listed here are the Clinton-Era immigration laws, PRWORA and IIRIRA, discussed in the text, because neither of these 
measures included amnesty provisions. 
